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ABSTRACT   Wildlife and its habitat has been the subject of dispute and friction in Africa, 
but many countries implement “community-based” approaches today. With the recent 
tendency of adopting more neoliberal defi nitions of this term, the exercise and embedment of 
power in wildlife conservation became the subject of studies. Using the case study of a 
Maasai society in southern Kenya, this paper examines the agency of local societies from the 
viewpoint of “positionings”: points of contention regarding wildlife; their attitudes toward 
conservation initiatives; and their representation of self-image. As community-based 
conservation (CBC) was implemented, the central point of contention shifted from land to 
benefi ts, and local people changed their attitudes from distrustful and exclusive, to receptive 
and passive, to more active. Also their self-representation changed from those of victims to 
conservationists. These changes prove they have a certain agency. However, the outcomes of 
their agency include both productive and unsatisfying aspects, and may lead to the 
reinforcement of the current animal welfare/rights-oriented policies that conceal the existence 
and opinion of local victims. The next step is to consider whether that agency can be regarded 
as a potential for abandoning the status quo and creating a more desirable environment.
Key Words: Wildlife conservation; Community-based conservation; Positionings; Maasai; 
Kenya.
INTRODUCTION
I. Confl ict over Wildlife
Since the time of colonization, wildlife and its habitat have been the subjects 
of national and international disputes and friction in Africa. On the one hand, 
when wildlife-based businesses occupy an important position in the national 
economy (e.g., sport hunting, trophy trade, safari tourism), many local societies 
have been deprived of their lands and rights by central governments, both pre- 
and post-independence, who curried favor with the business sector. On the other 
hand, when wildlife evokes nostalgia and romanticism for wilderness in those 
who live abroad and in urban areas, local people were considered to pose a 
grave threat to wildlife and have been constrained and evicted from what was 
thought to be protected. Local societies have shared the same land with wildlife 
while coping with its dangers and damages. However, up to now, many of them 
have fragmented their connections to wildlife and experience only “the cost of 
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conservation” (Western & Wright, 1994: 7), which elicits antagonistic attitudes 
and both implicit and explicit resistance from local societies toward wildlife 
conservation (Western, 1997; Neumann, 1998; Steinhart, 2006; Iwai, 2009; 
Meguro, 2013). 
Since the 1980s and 1990s, many countries have implemented a new 
“community-based” paradigm for wildlife conservation and natural resource 
management to rectify the situation (Hulme & Murphree, 2001a; Homewood et 
al. eds., 2009; Suich et al., 2009). The meaning of “community-based” differs 
among scholars (Western & Wright, 1994; Barrow & Murphree, 2001; Berkes, 
2004; Jones & Murphree, 2004; Child, 2009a), but there is a recent trend towards 
adopting more neoliberal defi nitions of this term (Hulme & Murphree, 2001a; 
Child, 2004a; Suich et al., 2009; Nelson, 2010). According to neoliberalists, “if 
species or habitats are to be conserved then they must not be isolated from the 
market” (Hulme & Murphree, 2001b:1). The devolution of private rights to 
individual landowners and the guarantee of free economic activities are rendered 
vitally important for eliminating confl icts over wildlife (Child, 2004b: 249; 2009a: 
427). 
Neoliberal conservation, however, has increasingly drawn criticism from the 
domain of political ecology. The discussion has only just begun, but in contrast 
to those who support neoliberalism, based on such economic and ecological 
outcomes in southern Africa as the increase in number of protected areas, wildlife 
population, and monetary income (Child, 2004a; Suich et al., 2009), these 
political ecologists pay much more attention to the operation of power and the 
injustice on the ground. They have demonstrated that the neoliberal approach 
risks oversimplifying the complexities of the wildlife conservation locations. That 
is, it neglects negative effects on local people such as the denial of rights, 
expropriation of land, and an exclusion from economic earnings that results in 
growing political, economic and social gaps among stakeholders contrary to its 
win-win suppositions (Igoe & Brockington, 2007; Büscher et al., 2012). In this 
way, insights into neoliberal conservation have been yielded so far, but there is 
a remaining important question with regard to local agency. 
II. Objectives
Diverse aspects of “community-based” approaches have been discussed so far. 
Some studies evaluated from the viewpoint of local attitudes after receiving 
tangible benefi ts (e.g., Kideghesho et al., 2007) and others examined the amount 
of money earned from wildlife (e.g., Child, 2009b), or the degree of devolution 
to local landowners of formal rights to wildlife (e.g., Nelson & Agrawal, 2008). 
Meanwhile, more scholars are thinking seriously about deliberative consensus-
making (e.g., Berkes, 2007), and the consistency between immanent development 
practices and extrinsic conservation goals (e.g., Meguro & Inoue, 2011). 
Regardless of the apparent diversity, these studies are similar in that they examine 
the conditions under which local people or societies conduct themselves in 
accordance with the ideal of “community-based” approaches imposed by outsiders. 
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The problem is that these discussions regard local actors as submissive subjects 
to external institutions, rather than recognize local autonomies and initiatives. 
On this point, an important outgrowth from the recent debate is the concept 
of “environmentality.” This term was fi rst coined by Agrawal (2005: 8), as “[a] 
union of environment and Foucauldian governmentality, the term stands for an 
approach to studying environmental politics that takes seriously the conceptual 
building blocks of power/knowledges, institutions, and subjectivities.” Agrawal 
(2005) writes of the operation of environmentality in “community-based 
conservation” (CBC) and discusses the process of construction of multilayered 
institutions and subjectivities by government—“governmentalized localities,” 
“regulatory community,” and “environmental subjects”—all of which work in 
accordance with the dictate of CBC. After that, four typologies of environmentality: 
neoliberal; disciplinary; sovereign; and truth, have been described by Fletcher 
(2010). From this point of view, Agrawal (2005) discussed only one kind of 
possible environmentalities, but Fletcher (2010: 177) stated that “various 
environmentalities may be mixed and matched in particular positionings within 
the conservation debate.” This presents the importance of being beware of the 
existence and operation of the plural forms of power.
The exercise and embedment of power in today’s wildlife conservation has 
been studied from the perspective of environmentality(ies). However, little has 
been discussed as to how local people/societies cope with such power(s) and 
to what degree they change their actions resulting in success or failure. The 
purpose of this paper was to examine the agency of local societies, as they 
experienced a series of extrinsic conservation initiatives.
III. Method
To grapple with the subject explained above, I refer to a recent anthropological 
study which deals with the issues of globalization, neoliberalism, and 
governmentality, and thus is helpful to this study. 
With a detailed study of the indigenous people’s movement in Maasai societies 
in Tanzania, Hodgson (2011) demonstrated the agency of marginalized people 
struggling to improve their political situation. The analytical perspective adopted 
is “positionings.” According to Hodgson (2011: 5), the analysis of positionings 
is to “examine the historical, social, political and economic contexts shaping 
how and why certain groups decide to project and promote particular images 
of themselves as, for example, indigenous, environmentalist, or feminists.” In 
other places, Hodgson (2011: 9) explains that “[i]ndividuals and groups position 
themselves for and against certain ideas, issues, institutions, and identities,” and 
(the analysis of) positionings “demonstrate the articulation of political economy 
and cultural domains of meaning, signifi cation, and representation.” In this way, 
the self-image and representation of marginalized people is of central importance 
in the analysis of positionings.
Similar discussion has also taken place in the realm of wildlife conservation. 
Now that “community-based” approaches prevail globally, the image of a local 
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situation and the representation of its stakeholders acquire more importance than 
before, because they are the principal criteria of contemporary conservation 
practices. When neoliberal conservation is discussed, the critics point out that 
those who follow its doctrine (re)present images which are at variance with 
local reality but convenient to justify and propagate their ideology (Büscher, 
2010; Igoe, 2010). Besides physical forces and local collisions, metaphysical 
images and their global circulation become an arguing point. However, whereas 
various forms of resistance have been studied so far (cf. Iwai, 2009; Meguro, 
2013), the possibility of strategic self-representation by local people has not 
been taken into consideration. 
This paper examines the positionings of a local society, the Loitokitok Maasai 
located in the vicinity of Amboseli National Park in southern Kenya, one of the 
most popular tourist destinations and a site at the forefront of CBC in east 
Africa. The change in their positionings is examined from the perspectives 
described below, namely points of contention regarding wildlife, their attitudes 
toward conservation initiatives, and their representation of self-image. I conducted 
fi eld research on an intermittent basis since 2005, which yielded a total of 
approximately two years of research. Most fi eld research was conducted at the 
Kimana Group Ranch in the Kajiado South constituency, although occasional 
visits were made to other parts of the constituency. Working with a fi eld assistant 
who translated from English and Swahili to Maa and vice versa, semi-structured 
interviews with key informants and participant observation at local meetings 
were conducted.
STUDY SITE
I. Loitokitok Maasai in the Amboseli Ecosystem
The Kajiado South constituency (6,356.3 km2), often referred to as the Amboseli 
ecosystem, is located in Kajiado County in southern Kenya (Fig. 1). Most of 
the constituency is within a savannah plain covered by bushed grassland that 
receives an annual average rainfall of <400 mm (Altmann et al., 2002). However, 
groundwater springs that originate from surrounding mountains and hills create 
permanent water sources. They enable irrigation cultivation in some areas of 
the plain. Situated near the center of this ecosystem is Amboseli National Park 
(390 km2), which is famous for its elephant herds and scenic view of Mt. 
Kilimanjaro. Like many other national parks in east Africa, Amboseli comprises 
only a small part of the wildlife habitat in the area. The park is not enclosed 
by a fence, and while local people are prohibited from entering, most of the 
wildlife lives outside the park and shares the same land with, and brings problems 
to, the local people.
The Kajiado South constituency has been the territory of the Loitokitok Maasai. 
The Maasai are Nilotic people, famous for being “people of cattle” (Galaty, 
1982). Semi-nomadic pastoralism is their major subsistence activity. They keep 
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cattle, goats and sheep, and among them, cattle play a vital role in their 
subsistence, cultural domain, and social relationships. Land used to be managed 
collectively in regional sections (il-oshon) in the absence of private ownership. 
Loitokitok is a subgroup of the Kisongo section. Livestock grazing is usually 
practiced within their territory, which corresponds approximately to the boundary 
of the current Kajiado South constituency.
Maasai society is organized around an age system; every 14–15 years, rites 
of passage are conducted and the men enter a new age-set (women have no 
age-set). Maasai men are classifi ed as minor boys without their own age-set, 
adult but unmarried young warriors who live together with peers of the same 
age-set, and married elders having a formally organized age-set. Boys usually 
live in their mother’s house and help with housework, including livestock grazing. 
Young warriors take on the responsibility of acting as guardians of local societies. 
When the need occurs, they practice war, raiding, and hunting as their privileges. 
Maasai warriors hunt wildlife to prove their manliness and win fame, drive 
away dangerous animals, and obtain materials for several items, but not to gain 
bush meat. Elders are general authorities of the society and when there are any 
problems, they gather to discuss matters and make decisions.
The group-ranch (GR) system was established and introduced to Maasai 
societies in Kenya under the provisions of 1968 Land (Group Representative) 
Act. The creation of GRs fragmented the sectional territory into smaller areas. 
The government encouraged pastoralists to settle within defi ned areas by granting 
them legal landownership. It also sought to transform their livestock-raising 
activities into a commercial industry. Each GR established its own committee, 
and the grazing lands became the communal property of those who were registered 
with the government. After the formation of the GRs, the people and their 
Fig. 1. Map of study site
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livestock continued to cross boundaries to use the natural resources they had 
used before this system was implemented. However, since the 1980s much of 
the previously communal land of the GRs has been divided into private holdings. 
In the Kajiado South constituency, where six GRs were formed alongside the 
individual ranches around the towns of Loitokitok, Rombo and Kimana, 
subdivision of the land did not occur until the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst 
century.
II. Outline of Wildlife Conservation in Amboseli
Kenya was established by the United Kingdom as the East Africa Protectorate 
in 1895, and the Southern Game Reserve (27,700 km2) was established in 1899. 
In 1906, when the Southern Game Reserve was expanded, the current Kajiado 
South constituency was included within it, and local Maasai were allowed to 
continue living there. Customary hunting by local peoples was prohibited by 
law, but the authorities did not strictly enforce this ban. 
The adoption of the national park system in 1945 elicited strong local resistance 
in Amboseli to the development of a national park. Consequently, instead of a 
national park, Amboseli National Reserve was established in 1948, to which 
local people had access. However, after independence in 1963, Amboseli National 
Park was established, after several instances of local resistance by way of hunting. 
Local people were removed from the land within its boundary in 1974. Afterwards, 
between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, with the aid of international donors, 
the government implemented economic and social development projects which 
targeted the GRs around the park. 
Since 1990, the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), a newly established parastatal 
organization that administrates for all wildlife and national parks in the country, 
has returned a certain percentage of national park admission fee revenues to 
surrounding GRs, as a CBC program. Additionally, in 1992, the KWS approached 
the Kimana GR, which adjoins to Amboseli National Park on its eastern side, 
with a plan to build a wildlife sanctuary. The sanctuary offi cially opened in 
1996 and started to benefi t the Kimana GR. In parallel with it, efforts to conserve 
wildlife in a “community-based” manner have been launched by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and private corporations in an attempt to develop the 
tourist trade within the ecosystem. In 2007, a global NGO began spearheading 
the implementation of a plan to create protected areas in a wildlife corridor 
called conservancies between Amboseli National Park and the sanctuary 
mentioned above. In 2012, a conservation fund was established, based on these 
conservancies, by the local people themselves. However, at the same time, 
triggered by a fatal human-wildlife accident, a critical situation that has not 
been experienced in recent years, arose between the Maasai people and the 
KWS.
In the next section, I divide this history into four stages based on the local 
attitudes toward conservation initiatives and explain the local situations in more 
detail.
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CHANGING LOCAL REACTIONS TO CONSERVATION INITIATIVES
I. Before CBC: Rejection of a Park(1)
In Kenya, the National Parks Ordinance was enacted in 1945 and the national 
park system was introduced. The Game Policy Committee was established in 
1938 and worked on the selection of sites for national parks and the contents 
of the legal system. In 1946, Nairobi National Park was established as the fi rst 
in the country, and the formation of Amboseli National Park was discussed by 
the government. However, angered by that plan, local people demonstrated their 
hostility by killing wild animals. This was because the establishment of a park 
would mean no entry or resource use by local people inside it. Finally, Amboseli 
was established as a national reserve in 1948, with the provision that local 
people would still be allowed to live in and utilize it. Local people continued 
to harbor a fear of land being taken by the government. In 1968, the government 
developed another plan for the creation of a national park with the stipulation 
that alternate watering grounds, located outside the park, would be developed. 
On this occasion, too, local people demonstrated their opposition through renewed 
wildlife killing.
During this struggle, in 1973, the Development Plan for Amboseli was 
completed by a group of people led by the Caucasian researcher, David Western. 
He later played a leading role in formalizing the CBC (Western & Wright, 1994), 
and due to its achievement, became the second director of the KWS. The plan 
was created as an alternative to a national park with the intention of effectively 
reconciling and balancing the protection of the ecosystem with the need to 
maintain local livelihoods. According to the Development Plan for Amboseli, six 
percent of the ecosystem was set aside for the creation of Maasai Park in order 
to conserve vitally important wildlife habitat. Local people would have restrictions 
imposed on their resource use within the Park. In exchange for it, they were 
guaranteed their rights to economic benefi ts from the park, and land other than 
the park. Major donors and related ministries expressed support for this proposal, 
but local elders not only rejected it but also criticized Western for his inclusion 
of the word “park.” Though a national park and the Maasai Park were totally 
opposite in their attitudes toward local society, because they bear the same name 
of “park,” they were the same thing to local people. In the late 1970s, local 
people were so overjoyed by the compensation offered under the plan, that some 
leaders pledged they would cooperate with efforts devoted to wildlife conservation. 
However, after the government failed to maintain the development aid during 
the 1980s, an increasing number of local people began bringing their livestock 
into the national park.
In this era, the point of contention was land, that is, access to the proposed 
area of Amboseli National Park. It covered the major part of Amboseli Swamp, 
which had been utilized by the Loitokitok Maasai, as well as wildlife, as an 
important grazing land in the dry seasons. Local attitudes toward conservation, 
or “park,” were hostile and skeptical. Their hostility was confi rmed by repeated 
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resistance in the form of wildlife hunting, which occurred even when the 
government made a concession and presented compensation. When a pro-Maasai 
researcher devised the prototype for the CBC, the local elders rejected it and 
rebuked him. During these determined reactions, they did not consider their self-
presentation. The reason why the plan for Amboseli National Park was devised 
was that the Maasai people were considered to be “degraders of the environment” 
(Hulme & Murphree, 2001b: 1), causing desertifi cation by overgrazing (Anderson, 
2002: 135). The Loitokitok Maasai understood the negative effect of a national 
park, and killed wildlife with the intention of thwarting the plan. However, no 
consideration was made concerning the destructive image of them held by 
outsiders, including policymakers. In fact, their headstrong attitudes resulted in 
strengthening their destructive image and urging the supporters of the national 
park to apply more pressure on the colonial administration.
II. Accepting CBC: Development of a Wildlife Sanctuary(2)
In 1990, the KWS was formed and CBC became one of the central policy 
issues. In two years, the KWS approached the Kimana GR with the proposal 
to build a wildlife sanctuary on its communal land. A sanctuary is, on the one 
hand, a protected area for conserving an important wildlife habitat outside the 
national park. On the other hand, it is an area for tourists to pay money and 
see wildlife. It took three years for the GR to accept the proposal. At fi rst, local 
people were distrustful and suspected the government of trying to take their 
land, and as in the case of Amboseli National Park, using wildlife conservation 
as an excuse. However, as the KWS arranged observation tours and brought 
local representatives to popular tourist destinations in the country, they were 
persuaded that the government had no intention of taking land from them. Also, 
as they had observed the operations of several tourism-related activities inside 
and outside Amboseli National Park, they came to expect that tourism would 
bring a certain amount of monetary benefi t to them. Consequently, the GR agreed 
to the construction of the sanctuary.
Upon its opening in 1996, the Kimana Community Wildlife Sanctuary (60 
km2) was jointly operated by a manager chosen from among the GR members 
and by the GR committee. However, as Kenya’s tourism industry experienced 
a nationwide slowdown starting in 1997, and in 1998 tourist visitation to the 
sanctuary also slowed. In 1998, the internationally sponsored CBC project fi nished 
and the KWS withdrew aid to the GR. Accordingly, the sanctuary was leased 
to a foreign capitalized tourism company, the African Safari Club (ASC), which 
was granted a 10-year lease from 2000 to 2009. With this change, the GR 
experienced a signifi cant increase in economic benefi ts; cash revenue surged 
from an estimated gross of around 17,000 USD (Knegt, 1998: 92 cited in Rutten, 
2004: 15) in the opening year to over 110,000 USD (Meguro & Inoue, 2011: 
35). This revenue was administrated by the GR committee and used for student 
scholarships, healthcare subsidies, and the subdivision of communal land. As a 
result of the subdivision, each of the 844 registered members acquired 0.8 ha 
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of farmland and 24 ha of dry land.
As explained above, when the local people fi rst heard the idea of the community 
sanctuary, they mistrusted the conservation initiatives, but their attitude changed 
to a more acceptant one. In the process, the point of contention shifted from 
land (the fear of land being taken) to benefi t (the expectation of tourism income). 
After the ASC developed the sanctuary and paid a considerable sum of money, 
there was no public support in the GR for asking for the discontinuance of the 
sanctuary, though the majority of local people did not approve the idea of CBC. 
On the other side, local people were alert to the government’s possible intention 
of land robbery at fi rst. Nonetheless, they did not consider their image, as held 
by outsiders, nor deliberately produce any self-representation so as to acquire 
more aid.
III. Negotiating CBC: Contracts with a Private Enterprise and an NGO
The contract-based income from the ASC enabled the Kimana GR to achieve 
its hoped-for subdivision of communal land. Generally speaking, the majority 
of its members appreciated the sanctuary as it produced tangible benefi ts. However, 
confl icts arose between the GR and the ASC. From around 2005, the ASC 
started to fail to pay its salary to the staff who were employed by the GR, and 
the land-use fee for the GR. The limited number of local people actually 
employed by the ASC, and the arbitrary withdrawal of tourist access to a cultural 
village, increased the discontent and anger of the members with it. The GR 
committee talked to the manager and the president of the ASC, but the problem 
was not fully resolved. The majority of GR members became unable to suppress 
their anger with the ASC. An armed faction led by the chairman and the treasurer 
stormed the sanctuary and forcibly evicted the ASC manager on September 11, 
2007. After this event, the GR had no will to renew the lease agreement with 
the ASC, but as a result of persuasion by an area Member of Parliament (MP), 
the GR determined to allow the ASC to manage the sanctuary until their contract 
expired in September 2009. 
In November 2008, discussions began regarding the selection of a company 
to manage the sanctuary after the ASC vacated this role. Three tourism companies 
in addition to the ASC applied for this position. The opinions of the GR 
“offi cials”; i.e., the chairman, secretary, and treasurer, divided on which company 
to choose, causing friction in the GR. Many members criticized offi cials’ conduct 
in public meetings, pointing out that it would be impossible to select the next 
management company unless the decision was reached consensually by them. 
Finally, at a meeting in July 2009, the three offi cials endorsed a proposal 
submitted by the MP, selecting a candidate that was not involved in the 
controversy, so as to prevent resentment in the GR. While discord increased in 
the GR, the members actively asked questions and made requests about contract 
clauses. Specifi cally, they attempted to clarify which contract would bring the 
greatest benefi ts. In addition, after the bitter experiences with the ASC, members 
cautiously discussed the duration of the contract and the opportunity to review 
its contents.
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Meanwhile, another project was launched in July 2007 by a global conservation 
NGO, the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF). Subdivision of the GR had 
enabled the enclosure, development and sale of a parcel of land subdivided that 
would result in the destruction and fragmentation of wildlife habitat. To prevent 
this from happening, the AWF presented a proposal to establish three 
conservancies between the Amboseli National Park and the Kimana Sanctuary. 
A series of meetings was held, but the local people did not express any opposing 
opinions. A basic agreement about land-use fees and other matters was reached 
in the absence of any signifi cant controversy. However, in September 2008, when 
the AWF was ready to sign a written agreement with 50 local people to establish 
the Osupuko Conservancy, the local participants expressed their fi rst strong 
resistance. On that day, the AWF representative left the meeting without any 
constructive discussion with members. This strong resistance by the local people 
had been encouraged by the chairman of the conservancy in an effort to pressure 
the AWF, which had yet to make any fee payments to members. A noteworthy 
aspect of this process is that when the members demanded the AWF pay the 
land-use fee immediately, they said that they would enclose and develop their 
land if the AWF did not agree with them, and that it was not the AWF but the 
members who had the right to make the fi nal decision. Their remarks showed 
that they were aware of their position as private landowners. Finally, the agreement 
was signed at the end of October, and the fi rst land-use fee installments were 
deposited in members’ bank accounts several days later, which left them satisfi ed 
and rejoicing.
However, more diffi culties subsequently arose with the contract. Some members 
sought to sign secondary contracts with other outside parties. Although the 
landowners were eager to sign, the AWF opposed these contracts because of 
the danger of damaging wildlife habitat. Other conservancy members stated that 
their behaviors were also against the contract. In the meantime, the local people 
repeatedly expressed an interest in raising the fees, but this proposal was rejected 
by the project manager of the AWF. In 2012, one member made new fi elds 
inside the conservancy and knowing this, other members said they would do 
the same if the AWF did not raise the land-use fees. 
While the donors are different, the sanctuary and the conservancy are the 
same in that both have wildlife conservation and local development as their 
objectives. For the members, however, benefi t is more important than conservation. 
Their attitudes toward outside developers and donors were more active. In the 
development of the sanctuary, locals welcomed outsiders and were ready to 
negotiate with them, trying to push through their own demands, grounded in 
the knowledge that they were landowners and thus able to decide land use and 
select a partner. Aside from monetary income, they asked the outsiders to do 
something about the human-wildlife confl icts, such as crop raiding and livestock 
depredation. Doing so, they presented themselves as victims of wildlife for the 
purpose of justifying their claims. However, things did not go as they wished. 
One tourism company made a promise that if it was chosen as the management 
body of the sanctuary, it would construct electric fences to prevent crop raiding 
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and pay compensation for livestock depredation, but the company was excluded 
from the list by the MP because it was involved in the confl ict.
IV. Proposing CBC: Claiming a National Park and Launching a Conservation Fund
In July 2012, a young warrior, a son of a member of the Olgulului GR, was 
attacked by a buffalo during livestock grazing, and subsequently died. This was 
the beginning of what was later called the “crisis in Amboseli” (Kajiado County 
Press, 2012). After the incident, a KWS warden inspected the attack location 
together with local residents. During the inspection, he insulted the local people 
by making an offensive insinuation about the boy’s death, saying that he might 
have been killed by a Maasai colleague, not a buffalo. Upon direction by local 
elders, more than two hundred warriors took revenge by killing a buffalo and 
spearing several elephants (The Star, 2012). After this, the KWS set up a meeting 
between its Director and the local Maasai community. However, on the appointed 
day, the Director just sent a member of the Board of Trustees and a warden of 
Amboseli National Park as his proxy, and did not show up. This infuriated the 
Maasai and the next day, more than four hundred Maasai men launched an 
attack on wildlife, killing ten buffaloes, one lion, and one elephant (The Star, 
2012). Subsequently, the KWS announced that the director had agreed to visit 
Amboseli and discuss matters with the local community on August 6. At the 
same time, the game rangers of the KWS, together with the General Security 
Unit, assaulted both young and elderly men living adjacent to the park, sending 
tens of people to hospital and worsening the relationship.
On August 6, the Director of the KWS visited Amboseli and talked directly 
to local people. During the meeting, representatives of the local community 
demanded the community’s right to manage and benefi t from Amboseli National 
Park. Their claim was based on the Presidential Decree of 2005, which ordered 
that the status of Amboseli be changed from a national park to a national reserve, 
meaning that jurisdiction over the land be transferred from the KWS to the 
Olkejuado County Council (OCC, the local authority for Kajiado County). They 
justifi ed their claims by arguing that the Maasai had conserved and coexisted 
with wildlife but received no benefi t from it.
In the meeting, unity of the Maasai with the OCC was emphasized, but the 
fact is that the council had rarely worked with the Loitokitok Maasai who had 
coexisted with the wildlife around Amboseli National Park and thus became the 
target of the Director’s discussion. The fi rst large-scale hunting in July was 
organized by the local people in the Olgulului GR without any specifi c motive 
regarding the national park. In contrast, the second raid on wildlife was led by 
the chairman of the OCC, who was a Maasai but not a member of the Loitokitok 
section. Many stakeholders, including the KWS, a conservation NGO and an 
offi cial of the Kimana GR, publicly harbored suspicions about the political 
intentions of the OCC to increase their rights and interests in a national park. 
The KWS Director rejected their demand based on the argument that the 
presidential decree was quashed by the High Court, and there was no law that 
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allowed the KWS to share the management and revenue of a national park with 
local councils and communities. However, he promised to increase educational 
subsidies, as local people had requested.
About a week after the meeting with the KWS Director, a ceremony to launch 
the Predator Conservation Fund (PCF) was held at the Kimana GR. The 
establishment of the PCF was agreed in June 2012 among about 200 members 
of three conservancies (Osupuko, Kilitome, and Nailepo), all of which had been 
led by the AWF. It was launched in the absence of any funds from external 
sources. In addition to the members of the three conservancies and the project 
manager of the AWF, the “offi cials” of the Kimana GR, the local MP, the senior 
warden of Amboseli National Park (an offi cer of the KWS), and representatives 
of tourist lodges in the area, were present at the ceremony. Two members 
received the fi rst payment of compensation money generated by this program. 
Also, a Caucasian entrepreneur who was running an eco-lodge and paying 
compensation for livestock depredation in Imbirikani GR received both a gift 
and praise. He had promised to help this program beforehand and gave monetary 
support for the ceremony. During the ceremony, many Maasai leaders spoke to 
the guests. They explained that the members valued wildlife and were willing 
to use their own money for its conservation, or added that they would welcome 
contributions to enable them to maintain the program for the sake of wildlife.
According to the leaders, the idea of the PCF originated with the members 
who were earnest in wildlife conservation, but there was a relevant context. 
Before they launched the program, the members had repeatedly asked the AWF 
and other donors for compensation, and these requests had been refused. Then, 
in May 2012, a committee member of Imbirikani GR gave advice to the chairman 
of the Osupuko Conservancy that instead of merely requesting unilateral aid, 
they should start a program by themselves to demonstrate their drive and the 
program’s value to potential donors. After this suggestion, the committees started 
persuading other members and established a new compensation program. 
According to the chairman of the Osupuko Conservancy, members would continue 
to contribute even if they received external funds because they wanted to diversify 
its usage. He noted that this kind of mutual aid was so common in Maasai 
society that members were accustomed to it.
In these two cases, the Maasai created new self-representations. Before, when 
they welcomed and asked outsiders for benefi ts and aid, they usually mentioned 
the serious damages by wildlife. Also, they showed no initiative in conserving 
wildlife by themselves. This meant that they asked for compensation and 
countermeasures from the position of being victims. In contrast, the speakers in 
the above-mentioned meetings stated that the Maasai had a will to conserve and 
coexist with wildlife, explaining local people’s voluntariness and eagerness for 
wildlife conservation and coexistence. When they demanded certain interests and 
support from outsiders, it was for the sake of the wildlife rather than the people, 
and the Maasai people were presented as conservationists rather than victims. 
This change in self-representation was thought to be their strategic choice, with 
due consideration of the present conservation policy which requests local 
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participation and community initiatives in coexistence, and for the recent aid 
framework demanding that local people show their “ownership” by making and 
observing contracts with donors (cf. Mosse, 2005).
POSITIONINGS OF THE LOITOKITOK MAASAI AND ITS OUTCOMES
I. Positionings of the Loitokitok Maasai
In the last section, the change in attitudes of the Loitokitok Maasai toward 
wildlife conservation was explored. To summarize, before CBC was implemented 
as a national conservation policy, especially from the 1940s onward as the 
national park system was introduced into Kenya, land was the central point of 
contention. The local people’s distrust of outsiders was so deep that they rejected 
even the prototype CBC because it included the word “park.” From the fact 
that, without any negotiation and compromise, they opposed, sometimes by 
resorting to force, any conservation initiatives that included the formation of a 
park, it appears they recognized little necessity in presenting a certain self-image 
to outsiders. The Loitokitok Maasai enjoyed several economic and social 
development projects from the late 1970s up to the beginning of the 1980s. 
However, judging from their reaction to the CBC initiatives in the next decade, 
these were not enough for them to suspend their animosity. 
In the 1990s, although they came to have expectations of profi t from tourism, 
when they fi rst heard of a wildlife sanctuary, the members of the Kimana GR 
suspected it was a pious fraud for another “land grab.” However, their fear of 
this land grab was banished once the KWS arranged an observation tour and 
discussed issues with local representatives. After that, the GR accepted the 
sanctuary, and the points of contention changed from land to benefi ts. As they 
received benefi ts from the company-operated sanctuary, they adopted more 
receptive and active attitudes toward potential donors and developers. However, 
this did not mean that local people welcomed all outsiders. Rather, having 
troubles with its manager, they tried to expel the ASC, despite the still-valid 
contract. Thereafter, they became more cautious of entering contracts with 
outsiders. In concurrence with this, their self-representation changed. Before, 
when they put their demands to private enterprises and NGOs, they used to 
refer to themselves as landowners or victims to justify their requests. More 
recently, local people have been represented as conservationists who have long 
coexisted harmoniously with wildlife and have the will to continue to do so in 
the future. This representation was consistent with outsiders’ ideal of CBC 
(wildlife conservation and local development with community participation/
ownership). Because this was a deliberative act, taking into consideration outsiders’ 
ideas, it is their “positioning,” in the original sense of Hodgson (2011).
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II. Intention and Outcomes of Positionings
The local people changed their attitudes, and later their representation so as 
to obtain more tangible benefi ts. In doing so, they proved that they have a 
certain agency. However, the outcomes include both positive and negative aspects. 
For example, the Kimana GR was able to start subdivision thanks to the monetary 
income from the Kimana Sanctuary. However, due to the trouble with the ASC, 
they did not gain any income for a few years. With regard to the Osupuko 
Conservancy, it provided annual incomes for its members, bringing joy to them 
at fi rst. However, as time passed, their feeling of satisfaction faded, and they 
started requesting an increase. This was refused by the AWF, and some members 
began to cultivate their land against the contract of the conservancy in search 
of more income. In the case of the “crisis of Amboseli” too, the Director of 
KWS promised an increase in educational subsidies for GRs around the national 
park, as his representatives claimed, but this had only been a minor request 
among various that were made by the Maasai people in the process of the case. 
Thus, we should not overlook local agency, but at the same time, we cannot 
overestimate it.
Another point of argument is the effect of their recent positionings, or the 
change in their representation. As explained before, the attitudes of the local 
society shifted from hostile to favorable, and from passive to active. In the case 
of the “crisis in Amboseli” and the PCF, the image of the Maasai people as 
what is usually called “conservationists” in Kenya (those who conform to the 
ethics of animal welfare and rights), was represented by the leaders. When some 
of those leaders were outsiders of the Loitokitok section, it is questionable 
whether they were legitimate representatives of the local community. This is a 
theme for further research, but it must be noted that the problem is not just 
their legitimacy as representatives, but also the content of the representation 
itself. After the closing of the meeting with the Director of the KWS on 6 
August, a local elder reproached the Director for not offering a solution strategy 
for dealing with the dangers posed by wildlife, citing the death of a young 
warrior. As this case suggests, the damage and dangers associated with wildlife 
are serious matters to the local people (cf. Meguro, 2010). The change in 
representation of the Maasai people from victims to conservationists only serves 
to keep the problem of damage infl icted by wildlife out of sight. 
Here, the problem concerning the current conservation policy in Kenya comes 
up. Local people must obey the laws, and those of Kenya are strongly infl uenced 
by the animal welfare/rights movement, which puts up a colossal sum for 
conservation-related organizations, including the KWS, and induces them to 
oppose any killing of wildlife (Kabiri, 2010; Martin, 2012). In the existing 
circumstances, becoming conservationists may be the only alternative for local 
people to make donors produce more benefi ts, and increases in monetary income 
may reduce the confl icts and mitigate the aggrieved feelings of the local people 
toward wildlife to some degree. However, it may lead to the reinforcement of 
the current situation and the concealment of the existence and opinion of victims, 
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leaving the mortal threat of wildlife and the use of violence to force them to 
accept things as they are.
III. Themes for Future Research
In this article, local agency is examined from the perspective of positionings. 
A tentative conclusion is that the Maasai people have not been passive subjects 
obedient to external powers, and even changed their positioning, which led to 
somewhat greater benefi ts, but when these changes were initiated by selective 
leaders, they carried the risk of failing to notice local opinions of protest against 
the status quo and the infl uence of the specifi c global environmentalism. To 
produce more favorable negotiating outcomes, at the expense of other issues, 
their positionings must be in line with the priorities set by outsiders. However, 
the PCF may provide us with a suggestion as to the potential of local societies. 
Although this program has not yet reached the evaluation stage, it nonetheless 
seems to be worthy of attention because it meets the requirements of supporting 
organizations and also conforms to local customs of mutual aid. 
On the one hand, we need to further study the politics of image and 
representation of local societies among multilayered stakeholders, on local to 
global scales, and on the other hand, we need to take a close and continuous 
look at a local society so as to follow their positionings, even if their actions 
do not always produce a result. After fi nding local agency, the next step is to 
consider whether that agency can be regarded to have potential for abandoning 
the status quo and creating a more desirable environment.
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NOTES
(1) This section is based on Western & Wright (1994) and Western (1997).
(2) This section is based on Meguro & Inoue (2011).
REFERENCES
Agrawal, A. 2005. Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making of 
Subjects. Duke University Press, Durham N. C.
Altmann, J., S. Alberts, S. Altmann and S. Roy 2002.  Dramatic change in local climate 
patterns in the Amboseli basin, Kenya. African Journal of Ecology, 40 (3): 248–251.
170 T. Meguro
Anderson, D. 2002. Eroding the Commons: The Politics of Ecology in Baringo, Kenya 1890–
1963. James Currey, Oxford.
Barrow, E. and M. Murphree 2001. Community conservation: From concept to practice. In 
(D. Hulme and M. Murphree, eds.) African Wildlife and Livelihoods: The Promise and 
Performance of Community Conservation, pp. 24–37. James Currey, Oxford.
Berkes, F. 2004. Rethinking community-based conservation. Conservation Biology, 18 (3): 
621–630.
Berkes, F. 2007. Community-based conservation in a globalized world. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 104 (39): 15188–15193.
Büscher, B. 2010. Derivative nature: Interrogating the value of conservation in “boundless 
Southern Africa.” Third World Quarterly, 31 (2): 259–276.
Büscher, B., S. Sullivan, K. Neves, J. Igoe and D. Brockington 2012. Towards a synthesized 
critique of neoliberal biodiversity conservation. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 23 (2): 
4–30.
Child, B. 2004a. Parks in Transition: Biodiversity, Rural Development and the Bottom Line. 
Earthscan, London.
Child, B. 2004b. Parks in transition: Biodiversity, rural development and the bottom line. In 
(B. Child, ed.) Parks in Transition: Biodiversity, Rural Development and the Bottom 
Line, pp. 233–256. Earthscan, London.
Child, B. 2009a. Innovation in state, private and communal conservation. In (H. Suich, B. 
Child and A. Spenceley, eds.) Evolution and Innovation in Wildlife Conservation: Parks 
and Game Ranches to Transfrontier Conservation Areas, pp. 427–440. Earthscan, 
London.
Child, B. 2009b. Game ranching in Zimbabwe. In (H. Suich, B. Child and A. Spenceley, eds.) 
Evolution and Innovation in Wildlife Conservation: Parks and Game Ranches to 
Transfrontier Conservation Areas, pp. 127–145. Earthscan, London.
Fletcher, R. 2010. Neoliberal environmentality: Towards a poststructuralist political ecology 
of the conservation debate. Conservation and Society, 8 (3): 171–180.
Galaty, J. G. 1982. Being ‘Maasai’; Being ‘people-of-cattle’: Ethnic shifters in East Africa. 
American Ethnologist, 9 (1): 1–20.
Hodgson, D. L. 2011. Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous: Postcolonial Politics in a 
Neoliberal World. Indiana University Press, Indiana.
Homewood, K., P. Kristjanson and P. C. Trench (eds.) 2009. Staying Maasai? Livelihoods, 
Conservation and Development in East African Rangelands. Springer, New York.
Hulme, D. and M. Murphree 2001a. African Wildlife and Livelihoods: The Promise and 
Performance of Community Conservation. James Currey, Oxford.
Hulme, D. and M. Murphree 2001b. Community conservation in Africa: Introduction. In (D. 
Hulme and M. Murphree, eds.) African Wildlife and Livelihoods: The Promise and 
Performance of Community Conservation, pp. 1–8. James Currey, Oxford.
Igoe, J. 2010. The spectacle of nature in the global economy of appearances: Anthropological 
engagements with the spectacular mediations of transnational conservation. Critique of 
Anthropology, 30 (4): 375–397.
Igoe, J. and D. Brockington 2007. Neoliberal conservation: A brief introduction. Conservation 
and Society, 5 (4): 432–449.
Iwai, Y. 2009. Community resistance towards wildlife conservation in Serengeti National 
Park, Tanzania: From “weapons of the weak” to the land rights movement. In (T. Meguro, 
ed.) Re-conseptualization of Wildlife Conservation: Toward Resonation between 
Subsistence and Wildlife, pp. 67–74. ACTS Press, Nairobi.
Jones, B. and M. Murphree 2004. Community-based natural resource management as a 
171Becoming Conservationists, Concealing Victims
conservation mechanism: Lessons and directions. In (B. Child, ed.) Parks in Transition: 
Biodiversity, Rural Development and the Bottom Line, pp. 63–103. Earthscan, London.
Kabiri, N. 2010. Historic and contemporary struggles for a local wildlife governance regime 
in Kenya. In (F. Nelson, ed.) Community Rights, Conservation and Contested Land: The 
Politics of Natural Resource Governance in Africa, pp. 121–144. Earthscan, London.
Kajiado County Press 2012. Kimana CBO Rolls out Projects to Help Morans (June 11, 2012). 
Kajiado County Press, Kajiado.
Kideghesho, J., E. Røskaft and B. Katlenborn 2007. Factors infl uencing conservation 
attitudes of local people in western Serengeti, Tanzania. Biodiversity Conservation, 16 
(7): 2213–2230.
Knegt, H. P. 1998. Whose (Wild)life? Local Participation in Wildlife-based Tourism Related 
Activities under the Kenya Wildlife Service’s Partnership Programme: A Case-Study of 
the Four (Maasai) Group Ranches Surrounding the Amboseli National Park in Kenya. 
MA Thesis, Catholic University of Nijmegen, Nijmegen (The Netherlands).
Martin, G. 2012. Game Changer: Animal Rights and the Fate of Africa’s Wildlife. University 
of California Press, Berkeley.
Meguro, T. 2010. The possibility of local people being involved in wildlife conservation: 
From the case of Maasai land in southern Kenya (in Japanese). Journal of Environmental 
Sociology, 19: 127–142.
Meguro, T. 2013. The dynamics of cross-scale linkages in the context of global commons: 
Aspects of “resistance” to wildlife conservation in the Maasailand of Kenya. In (T. 
Murota and K. Takeshita, eds.) Local Commons and Democratic Environmental 
Governance, pp. 234–252. United Nations University Press, Tokyo.
Meguro, T. and M. Inoue 2011. Conservation goals betrayed by the uses of wildlife benefi ts 
in community-based conservation: The case of Kimana Sanctuary in southern Kenya. 
Human Dimensions of Wildlife, 16 (1): 30–44.
Mosse, D. 2005. Global governance and the ethnography of international aid. In (D. Mosse 
and D. Lewis, eds.) The Aid Effect: Giving and Governing in International Development, 
pp. 1–36. Pluto Press, London.
Nelson, F. (ed.) 2010. Community Rights, Conservation and Contested Land: The Politics of 
Natural Resource Governance. Earthscan, London.
Nelson, F. and A. Agrawal 2008. Patronage or participation? Community-based natural 
resource management reform in sub-Saharan Africa. Development and Change, 39 (4): 
557–585. 
Neumann, R. 1998. Imposing Wilderness: Struggle over Livelihood and Nature Preservation 
in Africa. University of California Press, Berkeley.
Rutten, M. 2004. Partnerships in Community-based Ecotourism Projects: Experiences from 
the Maasai Region, Kenya Volume 1, ASC Working Paper, 57. African Studies Centre, 
Leiden.
Steinhart, E. 2006. Black Poachers, White Hunters: A Social History of Hunting in Colonial 
Kenya. James Currey, Oxford.
Suich, H., B. Child and A. Spenceley 2009. Evolution and Innovation in Wildlife Conservation: 
Parks and Game Ranches to Transfrontier Conservation Areas. Earthscan, London.
The Star 2012. Morans Kill Lion after Buffalo Kills Boy (July 20, 2012). The Star, Nairobi.
Western, D. 1997. In the Dust of Kilimanjaro. Island Press, Washington D. C.
Western, D. and R. M. Wright 1994. The background to community-based conservation. In 
(D. Western and R. M. Wright, eds.) Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-
Based Conservation, pp. 1–13. Island Press, Washington D. C.
Western, D. and R. M. Wright (eds.) 1994. Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-
172 T. Meguro
Based Conservation. Island Press, Washington D. C.
― Accepted July 7, 2014
Author’s Name and Address: Toshio Meguro, Research Institute for Languages and Cultures 
of Asia and Africa,Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 3-11-1 Asahi-cho, Fuchu-shi, 
Tokyo 183-8534, Japan.
E-mail: meguroguro [at] gmail.com
